Is Quantum Bayesianism all that Different?

It would be a mistake to think of this debate as being specific to quantum mechanics. Indeed, we have seen that the intuitions of physicists and philosophers, faced with the data stemming from QM experiments lead to realist and anti-realist conclusions, positing objectivist and subjectivist positions on opposite ends of the spectrum, while countless many fall somewhere in between. Although QM is a fairly new science, the problems it is enmired in are old. We have seen a familiar tale: science depends on inductive reasoning and resorting to probabilities when trying to predict a phenomenon. Fuchs and QBists borrow a subjective interpretation of QM and Earman tries to point out that it is not necessary to do so, for a pluralist formulation holding both objective and subjective stance might work just as well. The cost of following this is that it reduces the entire enterprise to recording beliefs about the world, but not endeavouring to use Bayesianism to discover knowledge of the real world. For philosophers of science, giving up on the notion of knowledge of the external world is a renunciation that very few are ready to make. The problems posed by induction and the assumption upon which we base our initial credence may appear insuperable, but this too is a belief that could be highly subjective.